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Abstract.... _ 
We consider a perfectly competitive economy in which only a finite number 
of different agents' characteristics can be distinguished. We associate this 
e economy with an n-agents' economy with an ordered Banach commodity space, 
and we prove that the continuum and the discrete approach to the equilibrium 
problem can be considered equivalent. 
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1 Introduction 
In economies where the mechanism oí períeet competition prevails, and in 
particular in problems related to Walrasian equilibrium, the participating 
agents should be modelled so that they act as price takers. Aumann (1964) 
emphasizes this íact to criticize the classical n-agents model oí Arrow-Debreu 
because, mathematieally, it is not possible to assume that the infiuence oí 
each agent is negligible. Alternatively, he proposed the study oí economies 
with a continuum oí agents, and the use oí the integral instead oí the sum 
to represent the average allocation rather than the aggregate. 
Following this approach, íor economies whit finitely many commodities, 
he showed (1964) that the core and the set oí equilibrium allocations coin-
cide (core-Walras equivalence), and he established (1966) the existence of 
a competitive equilibrium in exchange economies where the preíerences of 
the agents need not be convexo Bewley (1970) proved a core-Walras equiv-
alence result íor economies in whieh the cornmodity space is .coo(M, M, Ji), 
the space of essentially bounded, real-valued, measurable funetions on the 
measure space (M, M, Ji). Ostroy (1984) established the existence of equi-
librium in more general economies with a continuum of agents and infinitely 
many cornmodities. Kehoe, Levine, Mas-Collel and Zame (1989) analyzed 
the problem oí determinacy oí equilibrium in the context of separable Hilbert 
spaces. More recently, Rustichini and Yannelis (1991) generalized Aumann's 
results for economies in which the cornmodity space is an ordered separable 
Banach space. Moreover, they provided a counterexample which shows that 
the above result fails ií an "extremely desirable commodity" does not existo 
In all these models, the infiuence of each agent (or of a set of measure 
zero) is null because the integral does not change ií the behavior oí such a 
set oí agents is modified. The mathematical elegance oí this approach may 
not be inmune to the criticism that, frecuently enough, economic reality only 
allows us to distinguish a finite number of participants. 
In this paper we will consider a perfectly competitive economy (i.e., an 
economy with a continuum oí agents) with infinitely many cornmodities, in 
which only a finite number of different agents' charaeteristics can be distin-
guished. 
This continuum economy can be interpreted as a discrete economy with 
n agents in which each agent is repeated infinitely many times. The aim of 
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this paper is to emphasize that the continuum and the discrete treatment can 
be considered equivalent. To be precise, under the hypothesis of convexity 
of preferences, we show that an allocation belongs to the core (respectively 
is an equilibrium allocation) in the continuum economy if and only if it is 
an Edgeworth equilibrium (respective1y is an equilibrium allocation) in the 
discrete economy. By using the aboye result, we establish the existence of 
core allocations and Walras equilibrium in the continuum economy under the 
standard hypothesis for n-agents' economies. As a consecuence, we obtain a 
core-Walras equivalence for this particular economy. 
The convexity of preferences is indispensable to prove a lemma which sus-
tains the proof of the theorems. This must be so because we know that the 
core of an n-agents' economy can be empty without this requirement and, 
on the other hand, as a continuum economy, Aumann's result guarantees 
the non-emptyness of the coreo This means that if we discreticize a contin-
uum economy we ought to suppose that the preferences of the representative 
agents are convexo 
We refer the reader to Aliprantis, Brown and Burkinshaw (1989) for nota-
tions and results on n-agents' economies with infinitely many commodities. 
2 The madel and main results 
The commodity space is an ordered Banach space denoted by E. We denote 
by E+ and E' the positive cone of E and the space of continuous functionals 
on E, respective1y. We consider an exchange economy in which only a finíte 
number of different agents can be distinguished. To guarantee that each 
individual agent has no infiuence, the set of all agents is represented by the 
continuum [0,1] divided into n pairwise disjoint subintervals each of which 
represents a type of agent. 
We denote this exchange economy by Ec 
Ec == « E,E' >,jt,w(t),t E I== [0,1]), 
where < E, E' > represents the cornmodity-price duality. The set of 
n 
agents is represented by the continuum 1 == [0,1] == U!¡, where I¡ == [a¡-l, a¡) 
i=l 
if i =f n and In == [an-l, 1] denotes the set of agents of type i. Each consumer 
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t E J is characterized by her consumption set E+, her initial endowment 
w(t) = W¡ E E+ for all t E J¡, and her preference relation ~t = ~¡ for all 
t E J¡. The notation x ~t z is read "the bundle z is at least as good as the 
bundle x for the consumer t" and x -<t z is read "z is preferred to x" 01' "z 
is better than x for the consumer t". 
An allocation is a Bochner integrable funetion f : J --+ E+. An alloca-
tion is said to be feasible if Jfdp = Jwdp = Ep(I¡)w¡, where p denotes 
1 1 ¡=l 
the Lebesgue measure on the Borel subset of [0,1] (see Diestel and Uhl (1977) 
for the definition of the integral of a Banach-valued function). A coalition 
of agents is a measurable set S e [0,1] such that p(S) > O. We say that 
a coalition S improves upon an allocation f whenever there exists another 
allocation 9 such that fs 9 = fs w and f(t) -<t g(t) p-a.e. in S. The core of 
the economy Ee , denoted by e(Ee ), is the set of al1 feasi ble al1ocations that 
cannot be improved upon by any coalition of agents. A Walrasian equilib-
rium for the economy Ee is a pair (j, p) where f is a feasible al1ocation and 
p E E~ is a non zeroprice such that f(t) E Bt(p) = {x E E+/p(x) ~ p(w(t))} 
and if f(t) -<t x then x rf. Bt(p). 
This model al10ws to interpret economies with n agents as continuum 
economies where the ith agent is the representative of infinitely many identi-
cal agents. We can consider this model as a replica of an n-agents' economy 
in which each agent is repeated infinitely many times. Moreover we can con-
sidel' this model as representative of an economy with n non-homogeneous 
agents, where the relative infiuence of the ith agent is represented by the 
measure P(Ií) of each subinterval /¡. 
Gn the other hand, if we are not able to distinguish the infinitely many 
different characteristics of the agents in a continuum economy, we will wish 
to treat such a situation as a discrete economy. 
For these reasons, to each economy Ee we will associate a discrete econ-
omy with n agents En = « E,E' >,~i,w¡,i E {l, .. ·,n}). Then, an al1oca-
tion f in our economy can be interpreted as an al1ocation x = (x¡"'" x n ), 
in the n-agents' economy, En, where Xi = _(1) f f. Reciprocal1y, an allo-
p J¡ h 
cation x = (Xl,"', x n ), in the n-agents' economy can be interpreted as an 
al1ocation f in Ee , where f is the step funetion defined by f(t) = X¡ ift E /¡. 
Let us consider the discrete economy En associated with our economy 
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Ee . An n-tuple x = (Xl,"', X n ) is a feasible al1ocation if and only if the 
associated step function 1 is a feasible al1ocation in Ee , i.e., (x¡"'" x n ) is 
n n 
feasible iff L ¡.t(I¡)x¡ = L ¡.t(I¡)w} 
¡=l ¡=l 
We will say that a (discrete) coalition S e {l,···,n} improves upon 
an al1ocation X = (x¡, ... , xn ) whenever there exists another al1ocation Z = 
(z¡"'" zn) such that: L Z¡ = LW¡, and X¡ -<¡ Z¡ for aH i E S. The core 
¡eS ¡eS 
of the economy En is the set of feasible al1ocations that cannot be improved 
upon by any coalition of agents. 
If r is any positive integer then the r-fold replica economy rEn of En 
is a new exchange economy with r n consumers indexed by (i,j), i = 
1,"',n; j = 1,···,r such that each consumer (i,j) has a preference 
re1ation :5.ij = :5.¡ and an initial endowment W¡j = W¡. Every al1ocation 
X = (x¡" . " xn) in the economy En leads in a natural way to an al1ocation 
rx = (xn,"', Xln ... , X n¡, ... , xnr ) for the r-fold replica economy rEn by 
letting Xij = x¡ for j = 1,"', r and i = 1,"" n. Any such al1ocation is 
cal1ed an equal treatment al1ocation for rEno In this manner every al1ocation 
of En can be considered as an al1ocation for every r-fold replica economy rEno 
An Edgeworth equilibrium for the exchange economy En is a feasible al-
location (Xl,'" ,Xn ) that belongs to the core of every replica economy. A 
Vlalrasian (01' a competitive) equilibrium for the economy En is a pair (x,p) 
consisting of a feasible al1ocation X = (Xl" .. , X n ) and a non-zero price p E El 
such that Xi E Bi(p) = {x E E+/p(x) =:; P(Wi)} and Xi -<i X implies that 
X (j B¡(p). 
The aim of this papel' is to emphasize that the continuum and the dis-
crete approach can be considered equivalent. The next theorem makes this 
equivalence precise: 
Theorem 1 /1 the preference relation :5.i is convex and continuous for each 
i = 1, ... , n, then: 
a) If((xI""'xn),p) is a Walrasian equilibriumforEn, then (f,p) zs a 
Walrasian equilibrium for Ee . 
lNote that his feasibility condition is standard if ¡J(I¡) = ~ for aH i. Moreover, if 
¡J(I;) = J!.L, we could divide the n subintervals into q subintervals of identical length. If 
the al1ocition is an equal treatment al1ocation, the standard feasibility condition can be 
formulated as L:~=l a¡x¡ =L:~=l a¡w¡ which is the same as L:~=l¡J(I;)X¡ = L:~=l¡J(I¡)Wi 
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b) 1f (XI, ... ,xn) is an Edgeworth equilibrium for En, then f is a eore ( 
alloeation for Ee . 
e) 1f (1, p) is an equilibrium for Ee, then ((XI,' .. ,xn),p) is an equilibrium 
for En. 
d) 1f f is a eore alloeation for the eeonomy Ee , then (Xl,"', Xn) is an 
Edgeworth equilibrium for the eeonomy En. 
e 
To establish this theorem we need the íollowing lemma based in the mean 
value oí the integral: 
Lemma Let::s be a eonvex and eontinuous preferenee relation. 1f S e 1 
has positive measure, 9 : S --+ E+ is an integrable funetion and X E E+ zs 
sueh that X -< g(t) for all t, then: 
e 
x -< ¡.¡,tS) h9 
Proof.- The measurability oí 9 implies that there exists a compact set 
I< e S oí positive measure such that the restriction oí 9 on I< is continuous 
and thus there exits b E E+ such that x -< b ::S g(t) íor aH t E I<. We have 
y = ¡.¡,(~<) JJ{ 9 E CO(g(1<)) (see Diestel and Uhl (1977)), and CO(g(I<)) e 
{Z E E+ / b ::S z} because {z E E+ / b ::S z} is closed and convexo Thus 
x -< b ::S y. Analogously, if ¡.¡,(S \ I<) > o then x ::S ¡.¡,(S \ I<) h\K g, and ( 
again by convexity: 
¡.¡,(I<) ( 1 1 ) ¡.¡,(S) - ¡.¡,(I<) ( 1 1 ) 1 jx-<-- -- 9 + 9 =-- 9¡.¡,(S) ¡.¡,(I<) K ¡.¡,(S) ¡.¡,(S \ I<) S\K ¡.¡,(S) S 
Q.E.D.
e 
Note that the lernma is true if in the hypothesis and in the statement we 
substitute -< for ::S' 
Proof of theorem L-
a) Let ((XI,··· ,xn),p) be a Walrasian equilibrium for En, then: 
n n n n r( i) Jf = ¿ lXi =¿¡.¡,(Ii)Xi = ¿¡.¡,(I¡)Wi = ¿ l Wi = JI W 
J i=l J, i=l i=l i=l J, J 
ii) f(t) is a maximal e1ement for Bt(p) = Bi(p) for aH tE 1i 
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and thus (J,p) is a Walrasian equilibrium for Ec. 
b) Let (Xl,"', X n) be an Edgeworth equilibrium for En. Let us assume 
that a coalition S and a funetion 9 such that fsg = fs w and j(t) ~t g(t) ¡.t-
a.e. in S existo Let S¡ = S n J¡ and J = {i/ (3¡ = ¡.t(S¡) > O}. Let us denote 
Y¡ = ¡.t(~¡) fsi 9 and, for each i E J and k E N, af = E[k{3¡ +1] (E[z] denotes 
the entire part of the real number z). The sequence yf = k~¡ (y¡ - w¡) +w¡E 
a·1 
E+ converges to y¡ for aH i E J, and by the lemma X¡ ~¡ y¡. Thus there 
exists an index ka such that X¡ ~¡ yf for aH i E J and for aH k ~ ka. (*) 
Now, we consider the coalition with af agents of type i E J in the k-fold 
replica economy kEn , which improves upon the aHocation yf, because we 
have (*) and 
¿ k{3¡(y¡ - W¡) + afw¡ = k ¿ {3¡y¡ - k ¿ (3¡W¡ + ¿ a7w¡ = 
¡El ¡El ¡El ¡El 
k j 9 - k j w +¿ afW¡ = ¿ afw¡. 
S S ¡El ¡El 
c) By construction, (Xl,'" ,Xn) is an aHocation in the economy En, and 
X¡ E B¡(p) because p(X¡) = p(¡.t/J¡) Ji j) = ¡.t(~¡) 1. p(J) 5 ¡.t(~¡) Ji p(W¡) = 
p(W¡). If z ~ X¡ = ¡.t(~¡) Ji j, by the lemma, we have z ~ j(t) for aH 
e 
t E S e 1¡, ¡.t(S) > Oand thus p(z) > p(w(t)) = p(w¡). 
d) Suppose, on the contrary, that (Xl,' .. ,Xn ) can be improved upon in a 
r-fold replica economy rEn of the economy En by a coalition with a¡ agents 
of type i via an aHocation y¡, i E J (by convexity of preferences, without loss 
of generality we may suppose that the consumption vector y¡ is the same for 
e aH agents of type i). Thus X¡ ~¡ y¡ for aH i E J and ¿ a¡y¡ =¿ a¡w¡. 
iEl iEl 
Let a = ~i.r {¡.tUi)}. Now for each i E J, let Si e Ji be a subinterval 
with Lebesgue measure ai a and consider the coalition S = US¡ and the 
r iEl 
funetion 9 defined by g(t) = y¡ if t E 1¡, then the coalition S improves upon 
j via 9 because: 
i) f 9 = ¿(aia)Yi = (~a)¿a¡Yi = (~a)¿a¡w¡ = ¿(aia)Wi = j w ls ¡El r riEl riEl ¡El r S 
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ii) f(t) = X¡ -<¡ y¡ = g(t) Q.E.D. 
The rest of the section is dedicated to establishing results concerning the 
existence of core and equilibrium al1ocations in the economy t,e undel' the 
standard assumptions for n-agents' economies. 
Theorem 2 Jf for each i = 1,"', n the preference relation ~¡ is convex¡ 
strictly monotone and continuous on E+ with respect to some linear topology 
T on E less fine than the norm topology¡ and the order interval [O, w] is T-
compact¡ then there exists an al!ocation f : J ---+ E+¡ which belongs to the 
core of the economy t,e. 
Proof.-
Let us denote a¡ = J-l(I¡) > O i = 1,"',n. We choose n sequences 
{ai }meN of rational numbers converging to a¡ for aH i and such that there 
exists a real number r > Owith r < ai for aH m E N and a;.n +...+a: = 1. 
Given m EN, there are integer numbers p, q such that ai = P¡, i = 
q 
1, . o , n. We consider the q agents' economy t,q = « E, E' >, W¡j, ~¡j, i Eo 
{1,2, .. ·,n},j E {1,2"",pd), where the preference relation and the initial 
endowment of the ij consumer are identical to those of the ith consumer in 
the economy t,n. Under the hypothesis of the theorem, the economy t,q has 
an Edgeworth equilibrium (see Aliprantis et al. (1989)), which, due to the 
equal treatment property, can be expressed as (XI'pI , Xl, ... , X n ,Pn , xn ). 
In this way we construct n sequences {xi }meN contained in the order 
interval [O, ~w] which is compacto Therefore there exists y¡, which is the 
r 
limit of a subnet of the sequence {xi}, for i = 1,"', n. The step function 
f : J ---+ E+ defined by f( t) = Yi for aH t E J¡ is a core al1ocation. In fact: 
i) 1, f = t a¡y¡ = lim t ar(,8) xr(.B) = lim t ar(,8)W¡ = t a¡w¡ = 1, Wo 
1 ¡=l ,8 ¡=l ,8 ¡=l ¡=l 1 
ii) f cannot be improved upon by any coalition S of agents, because 
otherwise there exist a function g such that fs 9 = fs w and f (t) -<¡ g( t) 
for almost every t E S¡ = S n J¡ with J-l(S¡) > O. By the lernma we have 
y¡ -<¡ (l .) 19 for aH i E J = {1 :::; i :::; niJ-l(S¡) > O}o Denote Z¡ = 
J-l S s,S 
_(1.) f (g _ w) then we have y¡ -<¡ Z¡ +W¡ for aH i E J. (*)
J-l Ss Js¡ 
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For each index i E J we consider the sequence of real numbers converging 
to 1 defined by {k¡.t(f¡) hEN where af = E[k¡.t(S¡) + 1], and we denote 
a¡ 
k (k¡.t(S¡)) Th . .. . k h h 'fk kZ¡ = k Z¡. ere eXIsts a posltIve entIre o suc t at 1 ~ o, y¡ -<¡ 
zf + Wj. 
a¡ 
Therefore there exists an index 130 such that if 13 is greater than 
130, then the continuity of the preference relation implies x;n(ln -<j zf + W¡. 
We consíder the k-fold replica economy of the economy Em ({3) with k and 13 
greater than ko and 130 respectively, in which the coalition formed by af agents 
of type i E J improves the core allocation (xr,·· .,xr, ... ,x~, ... ,x~) vía 
the vectors zf +W¡ , because in addition to (*) we also have: 
¿af(z; +w¡) ¿[k¡.t(S¡)zj + afw¡J = ¿ k r (g - w) +¿ afwi = 
jEl ¡EJ ¡EJ 1st ¡EJ 
- k i (g - w) + ¿ afwj = L afw¡. 
s jEl JEJ 
Q.E.D. 
Theorem 3 Jf, in addition to the assumptions used in theorem 2, the prefer-
n 
ence relations are uniformly T-proper and the initial endowment W = ¿ a¡Wj 
¡=l 
is strictly positive, then the economy Ee has a competitive equilibrium. 
Proof.-
We know from theorem 2 that the economy has a core allocation, whích 
can be interpreted as an Edgeworth equilibrium for the n agents' economy En. 
The additional assumptions allow us to follow step by step the construction 
of the equilibrium price as in Aliprantis et al. (1989, pp. 138-139) and to 
obtain a competitive equilibrium in the economy En, which corresponds to a 
competitive equilibrium in the economy Ee . 
Q.E.D. 
As consecuence of the aboye results, under the hypothesis of the theorem 
3, the economy Ee has the core-Walras equivalence property. Note that the 
economy Ee is not in general included in the work of Rustichini and Yannelis 
(1991). 
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